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The integrated structure of consciousness: phenomenal content, subjective 
attitude, and noetic complex 
Abstract 
We explore the integrated structure (or the unity) of consciousness by examining the "phenomenological 
axioms" of the "integrated information theory of consciousness (IIT)" from the perspective of Husserlian 
phenomenology. After clarifying the notion of phenomenological axioms by drawing on resources from 
Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Section 1), we develop a critique of the integration axiom by 
drawing on phenomenological analyses developed by Aron Gurwitsch and Merleau-Ponty (Section 2 & 3). 
This axiom is ambiguous. It can be read either atomistically as claiming that the phenomenal content of 
conscious experience is an integrated complex and holistically as claiming that it is an integrated Gestalt. 
We argue that the latter reading provides a better characterization of the internal structure of the 
phenomenal content. Furthermore, the integrated structure of consciousness is not confined to the 
phenomenal content, but it also extends into the subjective attitude (Section 4). Subjective attitudes and 
phenomenal contents are interdependent constituents that jointly make up conscious experiences. This 
implies a novel theoretical challenge to the scientific component of IIT, which is to explain how to 
accommodate the subjective dimension of consciousness into its explanatory scope (Section 5). IIT can 
respond in a few different ways, but most importantly, it cannot just ignore it once and for all. As one 
possible way to address the challenge, we propose introducing a novel construct, noetic complex, to 
develop a fine-grained model of the neural underpinning of consciousness (Section 6). 
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Abstract  
We explore the integrated structure (or the unity) of consciousness by examining the 
“phenomenological axioms” of the “integrated information theory of consciousness (IIT)” 
from the perspective of Husserlian phenomenology. After clarifying the notion of 
phenomenological axioms by drawing on resources from Edmund Husserl and Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty (Section 1), we develop a critique of the integration axiom by drawing on 
phenomenological analyses developed by Aron Gurwitsch and Merleau-Ponty (Section 2 & 3). 
This axiom is ambiguous. It can be read either atomistically as claiming that the phenomenal 
content of conscious experience is an integrated complex and holistically as claiming that it is 
an integrated Gestalt. We argue that the latter reading provides a better characterization of the 
internal structure of the phenomenal content. Furthermore, the integrated structure of 
consciousness is not confined to the phenomenal content, but it also extends into the subjective 
attitude (Section 4). Subjective attitudes and phenomenal contents are interdependent 
constituents that jointly make up conscious experiences. This implies a novel theoretical 
challenge to the scientific component of IIT, which is to explain how to accommodate the 
subjective dimension of consciousness into its explanatory scope (Section 5). IIT can respond 
in a few different ways, but most importantly, it cannot just ignore it once and for all. As one 
possible way to address the challenge, we propose introducing a novel construct, noetic 
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Neuroscientific theories of consciousness aim to explain the neural substrate of conscious 
experience. In the early days, the primary approach in the field was experimental, focused on 
the question of identifying the neural correlates of consciousness in particular brain areas. More 
recently, however, researchers have begun to pursue more general characterizations of the 
neurobiological structures that underpin conscious experience (Boly et al. 2013). 
The integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness, proposed and defended by 
the neuroscientist Giulio Tononi and his collaborators, is arguably one of the most innovative 
and influential among such general theories of consciousness (Oizumi et al. 2014, Tononi 2004, 
2008, 2012, 2015, Tononi & Koch 2015, Tononi et al. 2016). The basic idea of the theory is 
that “consciousness corresponds to the capacity to integrate information” (Tononi 2004, p. 6). 
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We enjoy conscious experience not just because a large number of neurons activate 
simultaneously or even synchronously, but rather because these neurons interact with one 
another so densely as to constitute a single integrated unit. More specifically, according to IIT, 
each conscious experience is underpinned by a set of physical elements with the locally highest 
value of integrated information or Φ, a value that represents the degree of differentiation and 
integration of an interacting set of elements, which can be measured exactly in mathematical 
terms. 
Proponents of IIT often present the theory as consisting of three components, namely, 
phenomenological axioms, ontological postulates, and a set of identity claims (e.g. Tononi 
2012, p. 296). Phenomenological axioms are claims about the essential properties of conscious 
experience as such. Ontological postulates concern the essential properties of the physical 
substrate of conscious experience. The identity claims, sometimes called the central identity of 
IIT (Tononi 2015, Tononi & Koch 2015), address the relationship between conscious 
experience and its physical substrate (or more precisely, the abstract, mathematical structure 
of the substrate). 
Our primary aim in this paper is to develop a critical assessment of the 
phenomenological axioms of IIT. It is a distinctive methodological feature of IIT that it starts 
from an explicit phenomenological investigation into the essential properties of conscious 
experience. In our view, however, the existing literature on IIT fails to pay sufficient attention 
to this aspect of the theory. In particular, we find it unfortunate and surprising that there has 
been no attempt so far to assess the axioms from the perspective of philosophical 
phenomenology, that is, the philosophical method of analysis initiated by Edmund Husserl, 
and developed by a number of philosophers, including Aron Gurwitsch and Maurice Merleau-
Ponty, despite IIT’s explicit emphasis on the significance of phenomenology. The following 
discussion will attempt to fill this lacuna by developing a phenomenological critique of the 
phenomenological axioms of IIT. 
This means that the following critique has a limited scope. First of all, one of the main 
attractions of IIT is the concept of integrated information (or Φ) with the innovative 
mathematical method to measure it. Given our focus on the phenomenological axioms, 
however, the mathematical content of IIT lies beyond the scope of this paper.1 Secondly, some 
theorists, probably including Tononi himself, consider IIT as entailing some version of 
panpsychism, according to which everything should enjoy some degree of conscious 
experience. The argument behind this is that (a) any entity with some capacity to integrate 
information should instantiate some degree of conscious experience, and (b) everything has 
some capacity to integrate information according to the mathematical method proposed in IIT. 
The first premise (a) is closely related to the central identity of IIT, which we will briefly 
discuss in the paper. However, we will not offer any explicit discussion on panpsychism in the 
following.2  
Neither will our critique cover the phenomenological axioms in their entirety. In its 
most recent version, IIT advances five axioms about the essential properties of consciousness 
under the title of intrinsic existence, composition, information, integration, and exclusion 
(Tononi 2015, Tononi & Koch 2015). 3  Since our primary interest is in elucidating the 
integrated structure of conscious experience, our discussion will mostly concern integration; 
otherwise, it will only briefly address intrinsic existence.4  
                                                   
1 For commentaries on the mathematical components of IIT, see for example Barrett 2014, Beaton and 
Aleksander 2012, de Barros et al. 2016, Peressini 2013, and Tegmark 2016. 
2 See Schwitzgebel 2015 for a criticism of IIT in regard to its association to panpsychism. 
3 Hereafter, we will italicize the word when it stands for the name of an axiom. For example, “integration” 
refers to the axiom, and “integration” describes the relevant concept. We will also italicize a word to emphasize 
it, but then our intention should be clear from the context. 
4 Just to add a few comments on the other axioms we will not address in the following: The composition axiom 
holds that conscious experience has an internal structure. More specifically, it claims that it is composed of what 
Tononi calls (not unambiguously) “phenomenological distinctions”. The information axiom notes that each 
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We believe that the scope of the critique potentially extends to current philosophical 
discussions on the unity of consciousness (e.g. Bayne & Chalmers 2003, Bayne 2010, Wiese 
2017). In particular, our discussion directly concerns what Wanja Wiese calls “the problem of 
providing a phenomenological characterization of RPU [phenomenal unity]” (Wiese 2017, 
818). While many philosophers discuss the phenomenon by simply pointing to the fact that 
multiple phenomenal properties come together in conscious experience, we will attempt to 
clarify what it means from the subjective perspective to have an integrated or unified 
experience.5 In the following, however, we will leave the potential connections to current 
philosophical debates in the background. 
 After presenting a preliminary clarification of the notion of phenomenological axioms 
in section 1, we will develop our critique of integration in the next two sections. Section 2 
points out an ambiguity of the axiom in its current formulation. Section 3 defends what we call 
the holistic reading as being more congruent with phenomenological evidence. Section 4 draws 
out an implication of the holistic reading of integration. We will argue that the integrated 
structure of consciousness is not confined to its phenomenal content, but that it extends into its 
subjective dimension.  
The following two sections explore the implication of our phenomenological analysis 
of the integrated structure of consciousness for the other theoretical components of IIT. Section 
5 argues that it poses a novel challenge to the theory, which may or may not be met, but in any 
case, cannot be ignored. Section 6 outlines one particular way for IIT to answer the challenge 
by introducing a novel construct called the noetic complex. 
 
1. Preliminary clarifications of phenomenological axioms 
Tononi insists that scientific theories of consciousness should start from a phenomenological 
analysis of conscious experience itself. But why should neuroscientists consider 
phenomenology? Why is it not sufficient to approach the topic objectively, for example, by 
conducting experiments using behavioral markers of consciousness?  
There are at least two grounds on which to answer this question. First, proponents of 
IIT frequently refer to the heuristic utility of phenomenological analysis. On one account, IIT 
proceeds by “taking the phenomenology of consciousness as primary, and asking how it can 
be implemented by physical mechanisms” (Oizumi et al. 2014, p. 2). Phenomenology is useful 
for scientific inquiry, that is, because it allows the scientists to formulate specific questions that 
will help them unveil the nature of the physical mechanism underpinning consciousness.  
                                                   
conscious experience has a specific phenomenal content. This means that each conscious experience has an 
informational value by virtue of instantiating one content, among the totality of possible contents it can 
instantiate. The exclusion axiom describes the idea that the phenomenal content of a conscious experience is 
exactly identical with what one is consciously aware of in the experience in question. It forbids us from thinking 
that there might be more to the phenomenal content than one is consciously aware of, or that only part of what 
one is consciously aware of constitutes the phenomenal content. These axioms invite philosophical questions no 
less than integration and intrinsic existence. For example, what is a phenomenological distinction? What kind of 
part-whole relation does it have with conscious experience as a whole? (Composition) Is informational value an 
essential property intrinsic to experience itself? Or is it something that the theorist attributes to it from the 
outside? (Information) Can we always draw a definite line between what one is consciously aware of and what 
one is not? (Exclusion) We will not attempt to resolve these issues in this paper, however. See Cerullo 2015 for 
a criticism of IIT focused on exclusion.  
5 According to Wiese, investigations from the subjective perspective only provide possible solutions to the 
problem of providing a phenomenological characterization of phenomenal unity. We can determine the actual 
phenomenological character of a unified experience only by exploring the properties of the subpersonal process 
that realizes the personal level experience (Wiese 2017, 819). In contrast, we think that the phenomenological 
characterization should be obtained primarily through phenomenological investigations, which can be, but need 
not be, informed by subpersonal level investigations. 
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In addition to this, some philosophers argue that phenomenology is not just useful, but 
even indispensable for any theory of consciousness. 6  According to Taylor Carmon, for 
example, “[p]henomenology is inescapable, since it is what allows us to specify at the outset 
what any theory of […] consciousness must be a theory of” (Carman 2005, p. 67, emphasis in 
original). Conscious experience is by definition a subjective or first-personal phenomenon alien 
to objective or third-personal observation. We can observe and measure behavioral and neural 
markers of consciousness, but after all these are only markers of consciousness. The usefulness 
and the necessity of such objective methodologies are undeniable, but assertions about 
conscious experience are directly confirmed only in first-personal, phenomenological 
reflections upon conscious experience itself. We can never do without phenomenology, 
therefore, to evaluate and update theories of consciousness.7 
There is thus good reason that IIT develops its theory of consciousness based on 
propositions derived from phenomenological considerations, namely, what it calls 
“phenomenological axioms” (Tononi 2012, 2015, Oizumi et al. 2014). However, it still needs 
to be clarified what kind of propositions they are meant to be. The most developed account 
appears in Tononi’s article published in Scholarpedia, where he explains that 
phenomenological axioms are “1. About experience itself,” “2. Evident [in the sense that] 
they should be immediately given, not requiring derivation or proof,” and “3. Essential [in the 
sense that] they should apply to all my experiences.” In other words, they are “meant to capture 
the essential properties of experience.” Furthermore, Tononi states that phenomenological 
axioms should be “4. Complete”, “5. Consistent”, and “6. Independent” (Tononi, 2015, 
emphases in original). That is, the axioms should cover all the essential properties of 
consciousness (4.), they should not contradict with one another (5.), and each axiom should be 
logically independent from other axioms (6.).  
The last three characterizations are not so much about what axioms are as about how 
they should be formulated. Furthermore, what Tononi means in the third characterization 
(“Essential”) is reasonably clear. It is the first two characterizations, therefore, that we must 
clarify to better understand what phenomenological axioms are. 
What does it mean to say that phenomenological axioms are “about experience itself”? 
Tononi does not provide a clear answer, but it is possible to clarify the claim by drawing on 
resources from philosophical phenomenology. Of particular relevance here is Merleau-Ponty’s 
concept of the “phenomenal field” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, p. 52f.). In our conscious life, we 
constantly experience a wide variety of objects from our own first-person perspective, 
including natural things, artifacts, other people, our own mental acts, our own body, the 
surrounding environment, etc. In short, each segment of conscious experience consists of a 
totality of appearances of objects in the broad sense, and this totality is what Merleau-Ponty 
calls the phenomenal field.8  
We are usually more concerned with the objects that appear in the phenomenal field 
than the phenomenal field itself. However, the latter is not entirely beyond the reach of our 
                                                   
6 We thank the anonymous reviewer for pressing us to clarify the role of phenomenology in IIT. 
7 Michael Cerullo disputes the significance of the phenomenological approach by pointing out that it can lead 
different theorists to “very different conclusions about fundamental properties of consciousness” (Cerullo 2015, 
p. 7). This indicates, we suggest, not so much a problem of the phenomenological approach as the difficulty of 
getting fundamental issues right. In fact, philosophers have arrived at very different conclusions on every 
fundamental issue throughout the history of philosophy whether or not they preferred the phenomenological 
approach.   
8 Not unlike Merleau-Ponty, Elijah Chudnoff attempts to identify the object of phenomenological analysis by 
calling it “the total phenomenal state” (Chudnoff 2013, p. 560). However, there is a tension between how they 
each characterize the phenomenal field and the total phenomenal state. Chudnoff stipulates that a phenomenal 
state is “an instantiation of a determinate phenomenal property” (Chudnoff 2013, p. 561). Hence, for him, the 
total phenomenal state is a thoroughly determinate domain. In contrast, for Merleau-Ponty, a central feature of 
the phenomenal field is its indeterminacy. In fact, he considers it a fundamental problem of both psychology and 
philosophy of his time that they fail to “recognize the indeterminate as a positive phenomenon” (Merleau-Ponty 
2012, p. 7). 
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epistemic access; we are able to make its contents and structures explicit by reflecting upon 
our own experience, which is what phenomenology is all about. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, 
phenomenology is “the study of the appearance of being to consciousness” (ibid., p. 62). 
Drawing on this notion of phenomenology and the object of its investigation, then, we can 
understand that phenomenological axioms are “about experience itself” in the sense that they 
are claims about the essential properties of the phenomenal field.9 
Next what does it mean to say that phenomenological axioms are “evident”, or that 
“they should be immediately given, not requiring derivation or proof”? It is possible to clarify 
the claim by drawing on the phenomenological concept of “self-evidence (Evidenz)” (Husserl 
2012, p. 284f.). Consider the Cartesian dictum “I think, therefore I am.” Although it is possible 
to construe this as a conclusion derived from a hidden premise, “Every thinking requires the 
existence of a thinking self,” it is more congruent with the actual epistemic process to consider 
it as an assertion directly motivated by a reflective observation of one’s own experience. By 
reflecting upon the experience of thinking, that is, we can immediately see that the assertion is 
true, not unlike how we can immediately see that a physical object exists by observing it in 
perception.  
Husserl describes such experience in which we can directly see the reality of certain 
objects as bearing self-evidence or insight; he contrasts it with other types of experience, such 
as recollection and imagination, where objects appear without motivating us directly to believe 
in its reality.10 Drawing on this concept of self-evidence, then, we can understand Tononi as 
saying that phenomenological axioms are evident in the sense that they concern essential 
features of consciousness that can be presented with self-evidence by reflecting upon our own 
experience. In the following, we will express this thought by saying that phenomenological 
axioms are meant to be supported by phenomenological evidence. 
Does this mean that there is no room for errors and doubts in the phenomenological 
axioms? 11  The term “axiom” certainly delivers this impression. In fact, Tononi and his 
followers do sometimes associate the self-evidence of phenomenological axioms with their 
infallibility. In one paper, for example, they hold that “axioms are self-evident truths about 
consciousness […] that, with Descartes, cannot be doubted and do not need proof” (Oizumi et 
al. 2014, p. 2, emphasis added). In other places, however, it is also suggested that 
phenomenological axioms are fallible and corrigible. For example, Tononi and Christof Koch 
proclaim, “Whether the current set of five axioms are truly valid, complete and independent 
remains open” (Tononi & Koch 2015, p. 5). How can one consider the validity of the axioms 
to be open if they were truths beyond doubt? It seems that the axioms should be either infallible, 
incorrigible, and hence beyond doubt, or fallible, corrigible, and hence open to critical 
assessment. 
In which of these two ways should we understand the claim that phenomenological 
axioms are evident? We take the latter account to be more defensible for two reasons. First, it 
is more consistent with the actual development of Tononi’s thought on the essential features of 
                                                   
9 On another interpretation, the axioms are about the “semantic content” of experience (de Barros et al. 2016, p. 
57). We doubt that this interpretation does full justice to the claim that axioms are “about experience itself”. We 
also doubt that this is how Tononi considers the axioms. The interpretation in question is probably motivated in 
part by discussions of “concepts” and “conceptual structures” in IIT (e.g., Tononi 2015, Tononi et al. 2016). The 
vocabulary may suggest that, for IIT, experience consists in the conceptual content of conscious mental states. 
However, Tononi applies these concepts neither to conscious experiences as such, nor to the contents of mental 
state. Instead, he uses them to describe a specific property of the subcomponents of the physical mechanism that 
underpins conscious experience. The relevant property is that of specifying a certain cause-effect repertoire, i.e., 
a probabilistically distributed set of past and future states causally connected to the current state of the 
mechanism (e.g., Tononi et al. 2016, p. 452, Tononi 2015, Tononi 2012, p. 301; see also section 5 below). The 
frequent use of such words like “concept” and “conceptual structure,” therefore, does not justify interpreting 
phenomenological axioms as claims about the semantic or the conceptual content of mental states.  
10 See Husserl 2012, pp. 284-291, for more discussion. 
11 We thank the anonymous reviewer for pressing us to clarify this point. 
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consciousness. If you see Tononi’s exposition of the axioms presented between 2008 and 2015, 
it is clear that he has constantly updated his view through the course. It is difficult to make 
sense how this would have been possible if phenomenological axioms were incorrigible.  
Second and more importantly, it is more consistent with the actual character of 
epistemic inquiries to distance self-evidence from infallibility. Assertions are not true without 
any qualification just because they are based on self-evident experience. Even when you assert 
the existence of an object based on a perceptual experience of it, for example, it is always 
possible that the assertion turn out to be false on account of a later experience that reveals the 
illusory character of the original “perception” (Husserl 2012, p. 289). Hence, we must not think 
that a claim “cannot be doubted” just because it is supported by phenomenological evidence. 
This does not deny that some self-evident claims may be infallible or incorrigible. When it 
comes to the phenomenological axioms, however, unless there are other stronger reasons to 
believe otherwise, we should construe them as fallible and corrigible, just as perceptual 
judgments supported by self-evident observations are. 
With these clarifications in place, we can now move onto a critical assessment of the 
phenomenological axioms as it is currently proposed in IIT. 
 
2. Ambiguity in the integration axiom 
In this section and the next, we will develop a phenomenological critique of the integration 
axiom. As you can see from the title of the theory, this axiom has played a central role in the 
development of IIT since its most early stages––that is, since before Tononi started to make 
explicit use of the term “phenomenological axioms.” Here are three different ways in which 
he advances the idea. 
 
The integration of information in conscious experience is evident 
phenomenologically: when you consciously "see" a certain image, that image is 
experienced as an integrated whole and cannot be subdivided into component images 
that are experienced independently. (Tononi 2004, p. 3) 
 
Phenomenologically, every experience is an integrated whole, one that means what it 
means by virtue of being one, and which is experienced from a single point of view. 
(Tononi 2012, p. 295; see also Tononi 2008, p. 219) 
 
Consciousness is unified: each experience is irreducible to non-interdependent, 
disjoint subsets of phenomenal distinctions. (Tononi 2015; see also Tononi & Koch 
2015, p. 6) 
 
The idea seems simple and clear: Consciousness is an integrated or a unified whole; it is not 
just the sum total of its components. Even if we limit our attention to visual experience, for 
example, it is not just a combination of the left part and the right part of the visual field (Tononi 
2004, 2008, 2012, 2015, Tononi & Koch 2015). To see a blue book is not just to experience 
the blue color and the square shape of the book at the same time (Tononi 2012, 2015, Tononi 
& Koch 2015). However, there is a hidden ambiguity in this axiom as it is expressed in these 
formulations. As we will argue in the following sections, furthermore, it is crucial to dissipate 
this ambiguity in order to be clearer about the precise scope of the integrated structure, which 
IIT maintains is essential to consciousness. 
 Before discussing the ambiguity, however, it is important to clarify the subject matter 
of the axiom––that is, what integration is a claim about. Although it is posed as a claim about 
“conscious experience” or “experience,” if you look at what is actually said, it only appears to 
address what we may call the phenomenal content of conscious experience. Phenomenologists 
in the Husserlian tradition typically consider conscious experience to consist of a subjective 
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act and a phenomenal content, or a “noetic” and a “noematic” content in Husserlian 
terminology (Husserl 2012, p. 182f.). When you see a blue book, for example, your experience 
consists of the act of seeing, which is related to the phenomenal content of the experience which 
includes the book as it is presented to the experience. When you imagine the blue book in your 
bookshelf without seeing it, you have an experience with a similar phenomenal content, but 
this is correlated to a different subjective act, namely, the act of imagining. Accordingly, 
Husserl notes that phenomenological descriptions can be developed in two directions: 
 
[O]n the one hand, [there are] descriptions of the intentional object as such, with regard 
to the determinations attributed to it in the modes of consciousness concerned, […] This 
line of description is called noematic. Its counterpart is noetic description, which 
concerns the modes of the cogito itself, the modes of consciousness (for example: 
perception, recollection, retention), with the modal differences inherent in them (for 
example: differences in clarity and distinctness). (Husserl 1960, p. 36) 
 
From this perspective, any phenomenological description of conscious experience will remain 
incomplete until it addresses both its noetic and noematic dimensions. In developing the 
phenomenological axioms, however, Tononi is almost exclusively concerned with the 
phenomenal or the noematic content, paying much less attention to the subjective or the noetic 
act. Based on this distinction, you can see that integration only holds that the phenomenal 
content of consciousness is an integrated whole. (We will come back to the issue of the 
subjective or noetic dimension of consciousness in section 4). 
The axiom is still ambiguous, however, as to the precise meaning of integration. In its 
current formulation, it allows us to read it both atomistically and holistically. The two 
readings envision the integrated structure of the phenomenal content under different concepts 
of wholes: The atomistic reading takes integration as claiming that the phenomenal content is 
an integrated complex; the holistic reading takes it as claiming that the phenomenal content is 
an integrated Gestalt.  
What is an integrated complex? To see this, it is useful to compare it with another 
kind of a whole, a sum. Uriah Kriegel explains that their difference lies in the 
interconnectedness of the parts: 
 
Intuitively, the idea is that complexes involve an essential interconnection among the 
elements, whereas a sum is but the mere compresence of those elements. Consider the 
parts of an Ikea table lying about in a box, pre-assemblage, and the same parts put 
together so as to form a functional desk. The former is a mere sum of the parts, the 
latter a complex. Accordingly, it is possible to destroy the desk without destroying 
any of its parts, namely by destroying the interconnection among them; but the sum it 
is possible to destroy only by destroying one of the parts. More generally: a collection 
C of parts P1 , . . ., Pn  is a sum iff the only way to destroy C is to destroy a Pi ; C is a 
complex iff it is possible to destroy C without  destroying any Pi. (Kriegel 2015, p. 
162) 
 
A complex is an integrated whole in a way that a sum is not because of the interconnection 
among the parts, which is essential to make the whole the whole it is.  
How is a Gestalt different from this? Gestalts and complexes both can be destroyed 
by just destroying the interconnection among their parts. But they are different in the ways in 
which each of their composing parts maintain their identity. The composing parts of a 
complex retain their identity even after the interconnection among them is destroyed; the 
composing parts of a Gestalt can alter their very identity as a result of the destruction of the 
interconnections. When it comes to Gestalts, in other words, not only the identity of the 
Penultimate draft. Please cite and reference to the published version. 
Miyahara, K. and Witkowski, O. (2018). The integrated structure of consciousness: Phenomenal 
content, subjective attitude, and noetic complex. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. Online 
First. 1-28. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-018-9608-5 
 8 
whole, but also the identity of the composing parts depend upon the interconnection among 
them. 
To use a different pair of concepts discussed by Aron Gurwitsch, a complex is an 
integrated whole made up of merely interconnected elements, while a Gestalt is an integrated 
whole made of interdependent constituents. Elements “may be experienced both in isolation 
and in grouping without being internally affected by either mode of appearance.  […] 
[E]lements preserve their identity whether they are grouped or not” (Gurwitsch 1964, p. 144). 
In contrast, constituents are what they are in virtue of their “functional significance,” that is, 
the role they play to constitute the whole, and therefore they may fail to retain their identity 
when isolated from their current context: 
 
If a part is defined by its functional significance and, thus, proves dependent upon and 
determined by its co-constituents, it is the contexture of the co-constituents that 
qualifies the part under discussion. […] Qualified and defined by its functional 
significance with regard to other constituents, the part exists as that which it is only in 
its reference to the whole. Such reference is inscribed and included in the nature of 
the part, not as an additional modification, but as an essential determination. […] It is 
through realizing the whole that any part is made to be at its locus what it actually is. 
(Gurwitsch 1964, p. 145, emphasis in original)  
 
A constituent needs to be in the right context to maintain its identity. What it is is determined 
in part by the co-existing constituents and how they jointly make up a particular whole. As an 
illustration, consider team membership (Varzi 2016). In a rugby team, for example, the fly-
half is a fly-half only because of her functional role in the whole team, or only in virtue of her 
relation to the other members of the team who play different positions so that they jointly 
constitute a team. If you isolate the fly-half from the team so that she cannot join the game, 
then the team will cease to exist––unless a different player takes her place to play as a fly-
half––which shows that the team is not a mere sum of players. In addition, the one isolated 
from the team will no longer be a fly-half independent of her functional role in the team, 
which means that she has been a part of the team as a constituent rather than an element. In 
other words, constituents stand in a relation of “metaphysical dependence” (Chudnoff 2013, 
p. 564) to the other co-existing parts. In this sense, Gestalts consist of interdependent 
constituents, while complexes consist of independent, but interconnected elements. 
In light of this distinction, we can specify the ambiguity of integration as follows: it 
remains unclear whether it claims that the phenomenal content is an integrated complex or an 
integrated Gestalt. In fact, the axiom in its current formulation only states that the phenomenal 
content is not a sum total of its composing parts. Then how should we interpret integration? In 
which sense are we supposed to understand that the phenomenal content is an integrated whole? 
 
3. Holistic integration of the phenomenal content 
The previous section pointed out an ambiguity involved in the integration axiom. This section 
argues that we have good phenomenological reasons to adopt the holistic reading, according to 
which the phenomenal content of conscious experience is an integrated Gestalt made up of 
interdependent constituents. 
To see how the holistic reading is better supported by phenomenological evidence, let 
us first consider Gurwitsch’s phenomenological analysis inspired by Gestalt psychology of the 
experience of seeing an image of Rubin’s vase (Gurwitsch 1964, 117-121). You can see the 
image either as that of a white vase or as that of two faces facing each other (see below). What 
exactly happens in our experience when we see the image alternate its appearance? In 
particular, how does the boundary between the white and black areas appear in the course of 
this experience?: 
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One might think that the visual content of the experience is constant throughout the alternation: 
It is only the way we interpret the image that switches from one to the other; in particular, the 
phenomenal appearance of the boundary between the two areas never changes through the 
course of experience.12 Such account, however, proves inconsistent with the phenomenological 
evidence. For a careful phenomenological reflection reveals how the phenomenal appearance 
of the boundary itself varies depending on the phenomenal appearance of the other parts of the 
phenomenal content. When the white area of the image appears as a vase, the black area appears 
as the background, and the boundary appears as the contour of the vase or as delimiting the 
white area. Alternatively, when the black area appears as two faces, the white area appears as 
an opening in the background, and the boundary appears as the outline of the faces, that is, as 
delimiting the black area. Either way, the phenomenal character of the boundary is determined 
by the way its co-existing parts appear to us. In other words, they jointly make up the whole 
phenomenal content as interdependent constituents rather than merely interconnected 
elements. 
The holistic structure of the phenomenal content is not only found in such experimental 
settings. Consider the experience of seeing a blue and wooly rug. One might think that the blue 
color and the wooly texture are integrated in the experience in the sense of being attributed to 
the same object, the rug, but that each quality is determined independent of one another. As 
Merleau-Ponty points out, however, in perceptual experience, the color of an object is always 
co-determined by its other qualities: “A color is never simply a color, but rather the color of a 
certain object, and the blue of a rug would not be the same blue if it were not a wooly blue” 
(Merleau-Ponty 2012, 326). The phenomenal appearance of the blue color of the rug is what it 
is only in virtue of the co-existing phenomenal appearance of the wooly texture. Even if a 
porcelain plate reflected light with the same wavelength as the blue rug, for example, the 
phenomenal appearance of their surface color would be entirely different. We can talk about 
the experience as containing a blue color and a wooly texture as if they are mutually 
independent qualities, but the phenomenal appearances are interdependent on one another. 
The effect may be more manifest in cases that involve a dramatic change in the 
phenomenal content. Consider the following scenario: you are walking in a forest, and you see 
a flat, white, smooth stone lying ahead on the ground. Not wanting to slip on it, you prepare 
yourself to walk cautiously, but then after taking a few more steps forward, you notice that you 
are just seeing a patch of sunlight cast on that part of the ground (ibid., 310). In this example, 
your initial experience contained a white color and a smooth texture, while your later 
experience involved a light brown (of the ground illuminated by sunlight) and its rough texture, 
but the transformation does not happen part by part. You do not experience the transformation 
of the color and of the texture independent of one another. The change in color from white to 
                                                   
12 Carlos Montemayor and Harry Haladjian, for example, account for the perceptual experience of the duck-
rabbit image and of the Necker cube in the following way: “Neither of these shifts in perception entail changes 
in the object itself. The corresponding images, with their static and objective features, would constitute the icon, 
while that experienced changes would be characterized in terms of semantic content, attention, and epistemic 
access to mutually incompatible interpretations of the stimuli” (Montemayor & Haladjian 2015, p. 145).  
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light brown already implies the change in texture from smooth to rough, as well as the change 
in the identity of the object from a flat three-dimensional stone placed on the ground to a two-
dimensional patch of light cast on the ground. The phenomenal appearances of the color, the 
texture, and the object itself are all determined in relation to one another. Once again, they are 
mutually dependent constituents, rather than merely interconnected elements, of the 
phenomenal content as an integrated whole. 
One might object, however, that these examples only show how the thematic object 
shows up as an integrated Gestalt. Suppose we are right to say that Rubin’s figure, the blue rug, 
and the patch of sunlight figure in the phenomenal content as integrated Gestalts made up of 
interdependent constituents. Even so, this does not show that the entire phenomenal content (at 
a particular moment) is an integrated Gestalt. For phenomenal contents are not exhausted by 
the thematic object; they always include thematic parts and non-thematic parts, parts of which 
we are explicitly aware and parts of which we are not, parts in the foreground and parts in the 
background. To argue that the entire phenomenal content is integrated holistically as a Gestalt, 
we must show that the non-thematic parts are also integrated with the thematic parts as 
interdependent constituents of the whole.13 
In the first place, we can respond to this objection by using examples that indicate how 
the thematic and the non-thematic parts are not just co-existing elements. To draw on Merleau-
Ponty once again, when we see an object at a particular distance, the experienced distance is 
determined not only by the appearance of the object in question, but also in part by other objects 
of which we are not aware thematically:  
 
[O]bjects interposed between me and the one I am focusing upon are not perceived 
for themselves. But they are, nevertheless, perceived, and we have no reason to deny 
this marginal perception a role in the vision of the distance since the apparent distance 
shrinks the moment a screen hides the interposed objects. […] [T]he bell tower […] 
appear to me as smaller and farther away the moment that I can see more clearly the 
details of the hills and the fields that separate me from it. (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, pp. 
49-50) 
 
The same effect can be observed, for example, when we see the coastline from the ocean. 
Since there are only few objects, if any, interposed in-between, the coastline appears much 
closer to where we are than it really is. Notice that depth is an indispensable dimension of 
spatial perception: To see an object is always to see it at a distance. Accordingly, these 
examples strongly suggest how the phenomenal appearance of the thematic content is not just 
determined by its internal constituents, but that it is always determined in part by the non-
thematic parts of the phenomenal content (“marginal perception”) as well. 
 Elijah Chudnoff (2013) makes a different case for a holistic interpretation of the unity 
of phenomenal content by resorting to a general relationship that holds between the thematic 
and the non-thematic parts. There is a stark phenomenal contrast between these two parts: the 
thematic parts conjoin with one another to jointly form a cohesive individual; the non-
thematic parts also conjoin with one another, but only to form indefinite units. For example, 
recall how the black and the white areas in Rubin’s figure are not delimited when they appear 
as the background of what is in the foreground. This phenomenal contrast might tempt one to 
suspect that the thematic and the non-thematic parts are merely co-existing elements of the 
whole content.  
 However, whether a part of the phenomenal content appears thematically or non-
thematically depends on its relation to other parts, or more specifically, on its relevance to the 
thematic content (Gurwitsch 1964, pp. 340-341).14 Non-thematic parts of the content appear 
                                                   
13 We thank the anonymous reviewer for pressing us to address this problem. 
14 What Gurwitsch means by “relevance” is not entirely clear. Chudnoff explains it as a relation of “centrality” 
and points out how it can be determined in various ways. See Chudnoff 2013, pp. 569-571 for more discussion. 
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non-thematically precisely because they are less relevant to the thematic parts than the latter 
are among each other; thematic parts appear thematically precisely because they are highly 
relevant to one another. In Chudnoff’s words, the “phenomenal manner” in which any part of 
the experience figures in it––whether it appears thematically or non-thematically––is 
determined in part by its relation to the thematic content. If this is true, phenomenal 
appearances of the thematic and the non-thematic parts are determined in part by their 
relation to one another, which is to say that the entire phenomenal content is a holistically 
integrated Gestalt that consists of interdependent constituents. 
Is it not still possible, however, to consider the phenomenal content as nothing more 
than an integrated complex composed of phenomenal elements? These elements may appear 
to change their quality in relation to their co-existing elements, but this may only be a matter 
of appearance. For example, one might envision conscious experience as consisting of two 
layers of content, namely, iconic content and semantic content (Montemayor & Haladjian 
2015, pp. 145-149). On one definition, the iconic content of a visual experience consists of a 
“preinterpreted, strictly structural features of a visual scene” (ibid., p. 145); the semantic 
content consists of the visual scene interpreted in terms of specific types of visual objects.  
Take the experience of seeing a Rubin’s vase/face figure. The iconic content is 
something like a visual image that strictly represents the configuration of the black and white 
areas and nothing more than that. In the semantic content, then, the figure is interpreted as a 
depiction of a vase or of two faces. Based on this distinction, one might claim that the 
phenomenal content is exhausted by the iconic content. We argued earlier that the boundary 
between the two areas changes its appearance depending on the way the rest of the figure 
appears to us. However, this is not accurate. The phenomenal appearance of the boundary is 
invariant. It is only the way in which we interpret it that changes through the course of 
experience. It is entirely possible, one might therefore argue, despite all the examples meant to 
show the holistic nature of the phenomenal content to defend its atomistic nature: The semantic 
content is determined holistically; however, the phenomenal content itself is determined 
through and through by the invariant qualities of its composing elements. 
This account of the phenomenal content is not defensible, however, from a strictly 
phenomenological perspective. It is indeed possible to explain variations in phenomenal 
appearance by positing an invariant, iconic content beneath them. However, the invariant layer 
is not something about which we have direct phenomenological evidence. Even to say that the 
iconic content underlies the varying appearances, we have to admit that what we undergo in 
our experience is the variation. Phenomenologically speaking, therefore, the phenomenal 
content is better understood holistically as an integrated Gestalt made up of interdependent 
constituents, rather than an integrated complex made up of merely interconnected elements.  
All in all, there is good phenomenological reason to envision the phenomenal content 
holistically as an integrated Gestalt made up of interdependent constituents. We conclude for 
this reason that the holistic reading of the integration axiom is preferable to the atomistic 
reading. But then does the integration axiom interpreted under the holistic reading express 
everything that needs to be said about the integrated structure of consciousness? This is the 
topic of the next section. 
 
4. Integrating the subjective dimension of consciousness 
We submitted that the phenomenal content is integrated in the sense of being an integrated 
Gestalt. In this section, we continue our phenomenological analysis to argue that the integration 
of this kind is not confined to the internal structures of phenomenal contents but that it extends 
into the subjective dimension of consciousness.  
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The subjective dimension is an aspect of consciousness that is hardly addressed in the 
phenomenological axioms. The only place they barely mention it is in intrinsic existence, 
which Tononi formulates as follows: 
 
Consciousness exists: each experience is actual—indeed, that my experience here 
and now exists (it is real) is the only fact I can be sure of immediately and 
absolutely. Moreover, my experience exists from its own intrinsic perspective, 
independent of external observers (it is intrinsically real or actual). (Tononi 2015, 
emphasis in original) 
 
As we understand it, this axiom points to the subjective nature of conscious experience. Your 
experience of the book has an actual existence just as the book itself does, but their modes of 
existence are not the same. The mere existence of the book is not sufficient for there to be an 
experience of the book. For this, the book must be seen. There must be a subjective act of 
seeing correlated to the book. Consciousness is intrinsically subjective in the sense that it 
always involves a relation to a phenomenal content, an experiential relation that is also a part 
of each conscious experience. Accordingly, we can never understand what consciousness is 
without taking the subjective dimension into consideration. We take it that this is the idea 
Tononi tries to deliver in intrinsic existence.15  
Note that the claim here is not that consciousness requires a conscious subject, a 
persistent bearer of conscious states.16 To report our current conscious experience, we usually 
use expressions such as “I see a book” or “I am imagining a unicorn”. Based on such 
expressions, one might think that the presence of a conscious subject, the I, is a necessary 
component of all conscious experience; furthermore, this may lead one to think that 
consciousness requires self-consciousness, that is, an explicit or implicit awareness that you 
are the invariant bearer of the various conscious states that occur in your experience. It is not 
this line of thought––what Gurwitsch calls the “egological conception of consciousness” 
(Gurwitsch 1966b, p. 288)–– that is at issue when we talk about the subjective nature of 
consciousness. When we say consciousness has a subjective dimension, we only mean that it 
involves an experiential relation to the phenomenal content, also known as the noetic act or 
noesis in Husserl’s terminology. 
We think Tononi is right in pointing out that consciousness always involves a 
subjective perspective. In his writings, however, he does not provide much positive 
characterization of the subjective dimension essential for conscious experience. But then how 
exactly are we supposed to understand its relation to the phenomenal content?  We will take 
this question as a guide to further explore the integrated structure of consciousness. 
 
4.1 The basic phenomenological argument 
To answer this question, we can start by contrasting two ways to think about the issue. On the 
one hand, we can think of the subjective dimension as an impotent perspective onto the 
phenomenal content. The phenomenal content is determined in itself, and the only role of the 
subjective dimension is to bring this ready-made content to conscious awareness. On the 
other hand, we can also think that the subjective dimension is formative of the phenomenal 
content. Each phenomenal content is what it is partly in virtue of the character of the 
subjective dimension. Tononi’s choice of the word “intrinsic perspective” strongly suggests 
                                                   
15 Anthony Peressini advances a different interpretation. He argues based on a careful reading of Tononi’s 
writing that IIT means by “intrinsic” that something is an “observer independent (real) property” (Peressini 
2013, 199-200). We admit he is exegetically correct, and so the criticism is effective. But we do not think that 
this is the idea Tononi actually tried to deliver with this expression. For it is clear from what he writes that he 
wanted to emphasize how consciousness has a different mode of existence from other objective entities. 
16 We thank the anonymous reviewers for pressing us to clarify this point. 
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the impotent conception, while the term “subjective act” is more suggestive of the formative 
conception. However, IIT is not explicitly committed to either conception of the subjective 
dimension. 
 Then which conception of the subjective dimension fits better with the 
phenomenological evidence? Let us approach this question by first looking into a 
phenomenological analysis of Necker cube illusions (Ihde 2012, p. 65f; Merleau-Ponty 2012, 
pp. 273-276). The experience of seeing a Necker cube figure is often characterized in terms 
of a spontaneous alternation between two cube appearances. Don Ihde points out, however, 
that being spontaneous is not an essential feature of the experience. In fact, there is a 
particular correlational structure between the cube appearance and the way one sees the 
figure, and once this is recognized, one can gain some control over the appearance. Consider 
the experience of seeing the following figure: 
 
The appearance in which line AB is the closest to you correlates with a perspective where 
you look down at the cube, and the other appearance in which line CD comes forward 
correlates with a way of seeing where you look up at the cube. The looking down or looking 
up describes an imaginative direction of seeing, rather than the actual direction that is 
determined by one’s spatial relation to the figure itself. Even though the actual direction is 
constant, thus, in this experience, your imaginative perspective on the cube varies in tandem 
with the alternation between the two cube appearances. Based on this insight, then, you can 
somewhat alter the appearance at your will by altering the subjective act of imaginative 
seeing at your will. By looking down, thus, you can make the cube with line AB in the front 
show up, and by looking up, you can make the other cube appear instead. This is not to say, 
however, that you have complete control over the appearances. Despite your attempt to 
maintain a specific way of seeing, the figure itself often influences the way you see it, and 
this may result in an alteration of the appearance against your will. Merleau-Ponty denies, 
accordingly, that the way in which we see the figure is a matter of free, unconditioned choice. 
Rather, “[t]hey are indicated or recommended by the phenomena.” (ibid., p. 274) 
 A similar effect can be identified in Rubin’s figure discussed in the last section. In 
this case, it is perhaps easier for most people to change the appearance of the whole figure by 
trying to see the vase or the two faces. But again, typically, you will not have complete 
control over the appearances. Even when you see the vase in the foreground and the black 
area recedes to the background, the latter can somehow make you focus on them, and 
eventually, you might be led to see them as two faces in the foreground. Then perhaps after a 
while, the white area may begin to draw your attention, which will once again, lead to a 
reversal of the visual content. 
 These examples indicate a dynamic interplay between the subjective dimension and 
the phenomenal content. The interplay consists in how the two parts of consciousness are 
determinant of one another. On the one hand, the subjective act is formative of the 
phenomenal content. What appears in your phenomenal field in seeing the Necker cube is 
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determined in part by how you see it.17 On the other hand, the phenomenal content is also 
formative of the subjective act. How you see the Necker cube is determined in part by what 
appears in your phenomenal field. In other words, the phenomenal content and the subjective 
dimension interacts with one another in such a way that each part’s identity is determined in 
part by the other part with which it co-exists.  
If this is true, it means that the subjective act and the phenomenal content are 
interdependent constituents of the whole conscious experience. For this reason, we claim that 
the integrated structure of consciousness is not confined within the phenomenal content, but 
that it extends into the subjective dimension as well. Each conscious experience, therefore, is 
an integrated Gestalt made up of a subjective dimension and a phenomenal content. In the 
rest of this section, we will elaborate on this idea by examining three possible objections. 
 
4.2 How subjective acts form phenomenal contents 
The first objection addresses the claim that subjective acts are formative of phenomenal 
contents. One might say that it plainly goes against phenomenological evidence, particularly, 
in regard to cases of perceptual experience. We simply do not have the power to determine 
what appears in our phenomenal field. At least when it comes to perceptual experience, then, 
should we not prefer the impotent model to the formative model of the subjective dimension? 
We can answer this objection by clarifying what we mean by the formative effect of 
the subjective act. By this, we mean to describe how the subjective act pre-disposes the self-
organization of the phenomenal content in a certain direction. In the case of the Necker cube, 
even after you learn how to exercise some voluntary control over the appearance, it takes a 
short period of time for the transition to take place after you adopt a particular way of seeing. 
You do not have the intended appearance the moment you adjust your imaginative 
perspective. It is only after you let the other parts of the figure find their own place and take 
on a particular shape by themselves that you actually have the intended cube show up. As 
Merleau-Ponty notes, “Even in cases where the organization is ambiguous and where I can 
make a shift, I do not achieve this directly […] I am sometimes obliged to wait for the 
organization to produce itself” (ibid., p. 275). The subjective act contributes to the formation 
of the phenomenal content by exerting some influence to its self-organization. Understood in 
this way, the formative conception should appear much more congruent with the 
phenomenological evidence.  
 
4.3 The role of attention in ordinary experience 
The second objection concerns the scope of the argument. One might suspect based on the 
nature of the example we used in the argument that it only applies to conscious experiences 
in experimental settings. We can answer this objection by listing more ordinary examples, in 
particular, by observing the dynamic interplay between attention and the phenomenal content 
in those cases.  
Before moving onto the actual response, however, we should clarify the concept of 
attention at issue.18  Recent cognitive scientists, psychologists, and philosophers typically 
adopt a “function-centered approach” (Wu 2014) to attention, which identifies it with some 
functional role in the information processing of the cognitive system. In particular, most 
attention researchers consider the functional role at issue to be some form of information 
selection, even if their views widely differ as to the precise nature of the selection in 
                                                   
17 de Barros et al. (2016) indicates a similar point in terms of the “contextuality” of consciousness. They suggest 
based on this observation that it may be impossible to make exact calculations of Φ-values, not just as a matter 
of practical difficulty, but as a matter of mathematical incompatibility between IIT and the mathematical theory 
of contextuality. 
18 We are grateful to the anonymous reviewer for pressing us to be clear on this issue. 
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question.19 On this approach, attention can shape cognition and behavior without necessarily 
affecting conscious experience. Accordingly, in recent attention research, there has been a 
heated debate about its precise relation to consciousness––in particular, whether attention is 
necessary for conscious experience (e.g. Prinz, 2012) or not (e.g. Koch and Tsuchiya, 
2007).20  
In contrast, we will operate on a phenomenological conception of attention, according 
to which it is a subjective component of consciousness that plays some functional role within 
conscious experience. As a first approximation, the functional role at issue is that of 
transforming the phenomenal field. Attention is a process that leads one phase of experience 
to another. The phenomenological approach to attention is concerned with elucidating the 
nature of this process, in particular, by asking how it is induced from within the current 
experience and then how it gives rise to new phenomenal contents. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, 
the question of attention consists in “show[ing] how a perception awakes attention, and then 
how attention develops and enriches this perception” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, p. 29).  
Since our focus is only on illuminating the relation between the subjective component 
and the phenomenal content within conscious experience, we will not delve deeply into the 
phenomenology of attention.21 It is important to keep in mind, however, that the following 
discussion is pitched at the phenomenological level, and that attention is not considered as a 
type of information processing. Although we are going to discuss the role of attention in 
consciousness, thus, we will not advocate any particular position in the contemporary debate 
concerning the relation between the two terms. 
With this phenomenological conception in mind, let us consider how attention relates 
to the phenomenal content in ordinary situations. Take an example discussed by Tononi 
himself: the experience of lying on an armchair, seeing a blue book in your room. If you shift 
your attention from the book to the picture placed on top of the bookcase, this will change the 
phenomenal appearance both of the book and of the picture. The shift of attention decreases 
the clarity and the distinctiveness of the book and its properties, such as its shape, color, and 
texture, in your phenomenal field, while conversely increasing those of the picture. 
Moreover, even though you are usually able to shift your attention at your will and change 
the ways in which things appear to you accordingly, your attention is not under full control. 
Once your attention is directed at the picture as a whole, for example, it is not easy to retain 
this attentional attitude, for typically other objects in the phenomenal field (the details of the 
picture, other things or other people in the room, etc.) begin to draw your attention before 
long. Just like the previous examples, in short, the phenomenal content is partly determined 
by the subjective act of attending, and vice versa. This example suggests that even in ordinary 
cases, conscious experience consists of a subjective act and a phenomenal content as 
integrated constituents formative of one another. 
Admittedly, the formative effect of the subjective act is not exactly identical with the 
previous case. In the case of seeing a Necker cube, changes in the subjective act affect the 
very identity of the object that figures in the phenomenal content. When your imaginary 
viewing attitude towards the Necker cube figure changes, you see a different cube. In the 
current case, in contrast, changes in the subjective act only affect the way in which an object 
figures in the phenomenal content. When your attention shifts away from the book, and the 
book recedes to the periphery of your visual field, appearing unclear and indistinct, for 
example, you still continue to see the same book; it just appears differently.22  
                                                   
19 See Wu 2014 for more discussion. 
20 See Montemayor & Haladjian 2015, for a comprehensive overview and a critical discussion of the debate. 
21  See Arvidson 2006 for a contemporary discussion on this topic. 
22 Chudnoff describes the effect by making a conceptual distinction between two kinds of phenomenal 
properties, phenomenal content and phenomenal manner (Chudnoff 2013, pp. 565-6). Phenomenal content is 
determined by the things that are presented in experience, while phenomenal manner concerns the way in which 
they are presented. On this terminology, the phenomenal content changes in the case of Necker cube, while in 
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This difference, however, does not affect the claim that the subjective act is formative 
of the phenomenal content in both experimental and ordinary settings. For two experiences 
presenting the same object in two different ways are different in regard to their phenomenal 
contents. Even if the attentional shift had no effect on the identity of the object, therefore, as 
long as it changed the way in which the object appears in the phenomenal content, the 
phenomenal content is what it is partly in virtue of the subjective act. If this is true, we should 
think that the subjective act and the phenomenal content are formative of one another not 
only in experimental settings, but in ordinary situations as well. 
 
4.4 Subjective acts and mere subjective attitudes 
A different line of objection might be raised from reflections upon what is sometimes called 
absorbed coping (Dreyfus 2005) or the experience of flow (Csikszentmihalyi 1990). 
Absorbed coping is a form of bodily action that achieves its goal without involving explicit 
self-awareness of the action itself or of the goal. The most obvious cases of such experience 
are found in expert performances, for example, by professional musicians or top-level 
athletes; however, they also show up in ordinary, habitual behaviors such as greeting people, 
participating in rituals, or even adjusting your distance from other people in socially 
appropriate ways.  
Instead of shaping our own action at our own will, in all these cases, we are 
completely immersed in the situation that draws the action out of us: “the situation itself 
presents to me “reasons” for action that immediately draw on my body, soliciting a response” 
(Wrathall 2014, p. 3). In other words, we are “just doing what we do” (Dow 2017) without 
being self-aware of what we are doing or even that we are doing what we are doing.23 This 
suggests that the experience of absorbed coping is exhausted by the phenomenal content, 
involving no subjective act. If this is true, then we cannot say that the integration of the 
subjective dimension is essential to the structure of conscious experience. 
The problem with this objection is that it assumes, falsely in our view, that the 
subjective dimension of consciousness is something of which we are always explicitly self-
aware. Given this assumption, it follows from the experience of absorbed coping that 
conscious experience does not always involve a subjective dimension. The assumption lacks 
phenomenological support, however. For we are in fact not always aware of the way in which 
we are conscious of the phenomenal content. We might even say that it is more the rule than 
the exception for the subjective effects to operate implicitly. A naive observer looking at a 
Necker cube, for example, will seldom notice that her subjective perspective on the cube 
correlates with the appearing cube until it is pointed out by the experimenter. The lack of 
explicit self-awareness, therefore, does not imply the absence of the subjective dimension in 
the experience.  
For clarification, it may be helpful to describe the subjective dimension of conscious 
experience in general as subjective attitudes. Then we can draw a distinction between two 
forms of subjective attitudes, namely, between subjective acts of which the subject is 
explicitly self-aware while having the experience and mere attitudes which are invisible to 
the subject while the experience unfolds. On this terminology, the case of absorbed coping 
only shows that subjective acts are inessential for conscious experience; it does not show this 
about subjective attitudes in general. We therefore conclude that the case poses no threat to 
                                                   
the ordinary case of attentional shift, it is only the phenomenal manner in which the content shows up that 
changes. In contrast, we use the term phenomenal content to describe the totality of what correlates to the 
subjective act, including both the things presented and the ways in which they are presented, which roughly 
corresponds to what Chudnoff calls phenomenal character. For the various ways in which conscious experience 
is modified by attention, see Arvidson 2006, ch.3, and Gurwitsch 1966a, pp. 223-250.  
23 However, Dow (2017) criticizes the general characterization of absorbed coping in terms of lack of self-
awareness. This amounts to a different way of responding to the objection described in this paragraph. 
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the claim that subjective attitudes and phenomenal contents are interdependent constituents of 
conscious experience. 
 
If these phenomenological analyses are correct, we have good phenomenological reason to 
think that conscious experience is an integrated Gestalt that consists of a subjective attitude 
and a phenomenal content. When IIT addresses the integrated structure of consciousness, it 
only considers the integration internal to the phenomenal content. If the integration of the 
phenomenal content is best understood holistically, as we argued in the previous section, 
however, we should think of the integrated structure as extending into the subjective attitude 
as well. 
 
5. A novel theoretical challenge for IIT 
We have argued so far on phenomenological grounds that conscious experience is an integrated 
Gestalt constituted by a subjective attitude and a phenomenal content. But what difference does 
this make to IIT qua a scientific theory of the neural substrate of consciousness? We claim that 
our phenomenological critique poses IIT a novel theoretical challenge. To explain the 
challenge, however, we must introduce some ideas that figure in the other components of the 
theory, namely, the ontological postulates and the central identity. 
It is in the ontological postulates that IIT develops its account of the neural substrate of 
consciousness. As we saw in the introduction, the main idea is that conscious experience is 
underpinned by a set of physical elements with the highest degree of differentiation and 
integration. More specifically, any physical system can be analyzed as a structure of complexes, 
that is, sets of physical elements with a degree of differentiation and integration or a Φ-value 
(Note that this is a different concept of “complex” from the mereological one discussed in 
section 2). Among them is a set of elements with the highest Φ-value (“Φmax”), which is called 
the main complex or the major complex of the system. Furthermore, each complex has its own 
conceptual structure––that is, each stands in a unique probabilistic relation to a different set of 
past and future states by virtue of the nature of its subcomponents and the interaction among 
them (e.g. Tononi 2015, Tononi et al. 2016). Different complexes with the same Φ-value will 
be differentiated by their conceptual structure. Thus the conceptual structure of the major 
complex varies as different sets of elements bear the highest Φ-value as the whole system 
changes its state through time. At any particular moment, however, it is the major complex of 
the system with its unique conceptual structure that underpins the corresponding conscious 
experience of that moment.24 
 The other component of IIT, the central identity, concerns the relation between 
conscious experience and its physical substrate, or more specifically, the conceptual structure 
of the major complex. It claims that they are identical with one another. However, the sense in 
which they are identical remains ambiguous. Here is one of the recent formulations of the 
claim: 
 
[T]he central identity of IIT can be formulated quite simply: an experience is 
identical to a conceptual structure that is maximally irreducible intrinsically [i.e., 
the conceptual structure of the major complex]. More precisely, a conceptual 
structure completely specifies both the quantity and the quality of experience: how 
much the system exists—the quantity or level of consciousness—is measured by its 
Φmax value—the intrinsic irreducibility of the conceptual structure; which way it 
exists—the quality or content of consciousness— is specified by the shape of the 
conceptual structure.  (Tononi & Koch, 2015, p. 9, emphases in italics in original, 
                                                   
24 See Oizumi et al. 2014, pp. 3-15 for more detail. 
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emphases in bold added; see also Tononi 2012, pp. 317-318, Oizumi et al. 2014, p. 
3, Tononi 2015) 
 
On the one hand, this allows a strong metaphysical reading, according to which conscious 
experience is nothing but the conceptual structure of the major complex. On this view, there is 
nothing more to being conscious than being a physical system with a particular Φ-value and a 
conceptual structure. This reading of the central identity is arguably the reason that some 
theorists including Tononi himself consider IIT to entail panpsychism.  
One concern with this reading, however, is that there is almost nothing in the other 
components of IIT––the phenomenological axioms and the ontological postulates––that 
motivate this metaphysical claim. In the axioms and the postulates, IIT offers a general account 
of the physical mechanism of consciousness by focusing on its capacity to generate an 
integrated experience at the phenomenological level. What this implies about the metaphysical 
status of consciousness changes depending on the modality of the account. If the conceptual 
structure is considered to specify conscious experience by metaphysical necessity, then the 
account implies some form of physicalist panpsychism. If the specification relation is 
considered as nothing more than a contingent law of nature, the account implies some form of 
dualism. Either modal interpretation, however, is coherent with IIT’s account of the mechanism 
of consciousness. This means that neither interpretation follows directly from the latter.25  
Although Tononi himself seems sympathetic to the panpsychic reading, accordingly, 
we will not consider this metaphysical commitment as an essential part of IIT. Instead, we 
adopt a more empirical reading of the central identity, according to which it is literally a claim 
about specification or systematic mapping. The question is whether there really holds a 
specification or mapping relation between the mathematical structure of the physical substrate 
and the phenomenological structure of conscious experience. Whether or not one agrees with 
the claim, this seems to be a sound empirical hypothesis inviting further scientific 
investigation.26 
Then we can think of the phenomenological analysis of the integrated structure of 
conscious experience developed so far as implying a novel theoretical challenge to IIT in the 
following way. The central identity taken as an empirical hypothesis consists of two claims: 
one about the possibility of specifying “the quantity or level of consciousness” from the Φ-
value of the major complex; the other about the possibility of specifying “the quality or 
content of consciousness” from the conceptual structure. The former claim matters less for 
the current discussion.27 The challenge from the phenomenological critique emerges more in 
relation to the latter claim: If we are right that conscious experiences are integrated Gestalts 
consisting of a subjective dimension and a phenomenal content, then how should we consider 
the relation between the former and the physical substrate of consciousness? Given the 
central identity of IIT, it seems natural to posit a systematic mapping not only from the 
physical substrate onto the phenomenal content, but also onto the subjective dimension of the 
experience. The theoretical challenge is to explain how this might be the case. 
                                                   
25 As Peressini points out, the claim is only motivated by the observation that both the phenomenal content and 
the major complex bear an integrated, holistic structure of some sort, which he describes dismissively as “thin 
stuff on which to ground the [identity] claim” (Peressini 2013, p. 194). 
26 This is to say that we are going to read IIT as a theoretical framework that intends to unify phenomenological 
and neuroscientific accounts of consciousness, an answer to what Lutz and Thompson (2003) calls the 
“explanatory gap problem”, as opposed to the hard problem of explaining the metaphysical relation between 
consciousness and physical nature (see Lutz & Thompson 2003, pp. 47-48). We are not alone in adopting such 
an empirical reading of IIT. For example, Tsuchiya et al. (2015) presumes an empirical interpretation of the 
central identity to suggest the possibility of testing the proposal by using the mathematical formalism of 
category theory. Similarly, Yoshimi (2011) suggests, independently of IIT, the possibility of identifying a 
“supervenience function” that links mathematically the dynamics of brain activity with that of conscious 
experience. 
27 See Bayne, Hohwy, and Owen 2016 for a critical assessment of the concept of the level of consciousness. 
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There are a few dialectic options IIT can adopt in response. One option is to face up 
the challenge. IIT can update the current account of the physical substrate of consciousness 
so as to accommodate the subjective dimension into its explanatory scope. As the current 
version of the identity thesis holds that the phenomenal content maps onto the major 
complex, this update probably involves introducing a new theoretical construct that captures 
the aspect of the physical substrate that specifies the subjective dimension of conscious 
experience. Another option is to back up. One can drop the challenge, that is, by limiting the 
scope of the identity thesis to the phenomenal content of conscious experience. 28 Anthony 
Peressini, for example, argues that IIT is better understood as a theory only about the 
“qualitative character” (or the phenomenal content in our expression) of conscious 
experience, that is, as “integrated information theory of qualia (IITQ)” (Peressini 2013). 
Given the integrated structure at the phenomenological level, we are not sure if the 
neuroscientific account of the subjective dimension and that of the phenomenal content can 
really have different foundations. But this is an open question for further philosophical and 
empirical investigation. A third option is to dispute the phenomenology. One might deal with 
our challenge, that is, by denying that conscious experience is an integrated Gestalt 
constituted by a subjective dimension and a phenomenal content.  
In any case, IIT does not afford to simply ignore the challenge. The most important 
implication from the phenomenological discussion is that whichever dialectic option one 
chooses to take, a serious consideration about the treatment of the subjective dimension is 
inevitable. If we are not going to back up or dispute the phenomenology, however, how could 
we possibly update IIT to accommodate the subjective dimension into its explanatory scope? 
The next section sketches one possible way to answer this question. 
 
6. The noetic complex proposal 
IIT holds that the major complex of the brain underpins conscious experience. The state of 
the brain at a particular moment, however, is not exhausted by the set of physical elements 
making up the major complex. This is made clear in one of the most recent presentations of 
IIT in terms of the distinction between major and minor complexes (Oizumi et al. 2014). 
While the former denotes the set of interacting elements with the locally highest Φ-value, the 
latter refers to other sets of interacting elements with some φ-value greater than zero. 
According to Tononi and his collaborators, “a system can condense [i.e., can be analyzed] 
into a major complex and minor complexes that may or may not interact with it” (ibid., p. 
16).  
Given that minor complexes are also realizations of some capacity to integrate 
information, they are also considered as making some contribution to consciousness. In 
particular, it is suggested that minor complexes qualify as “minimally conscious” (ibid.). That 
is, the brain realizes more than one conscious experience by containing more than one 
complexes; however, we only become aware of the content realized by the major complex 
because it involves a larger quantity or level of consciousness compared to the other contents 
realized by the minor complexes. “In the healthy, adult human brain the qualia and Φmax 
generated by the dominant main complex are likely to dwarf those specified by the minimally 
conscious minor complexes” (ibid.). 
We find the introduction of the distinction between major complex and minor 
complex useful for better explaining the internal structure of the physical system underlying 
consciousness. However, we find it unilluminating to interpret minor complexes as 
specifying minimally conscious content of which we are completely unaware. It is an 
excessively speculative interpretation because no phenomenological evidence is available for 
the existence of minimally conscious contents in the first place; even worse, this is so 
                                                   
28 We thank the anonymous reviewer for reminding us of this option.  
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precisely because of their definitive characterization as something beyond conscious 
awareness.  
We therefore submit an alternative interpretation. We propose to develop the concept 
of minor complex so as to make it help IIT answer the theoretical challenge described in the 
last section––that is, the challenge to explain the neural substrate of the subjective dimension 
of consciousness. The proposal is to posit a specific class of minor complex that specifies the 
nature of the subjective dimension of the experience that is in place at the time. We shall call 
this class of minor complex specific to the subjective dimension noetic complex. 
The proposal raises an immediate question. What are the differentiating features of 
noetic complexes? What makes them different from mere minor complexes that do not 
specify the subjective dimension of consciousness? We can start answering this question by 
focusing on the dynamic interplay between the subjective attitude and the phenomenal 
content at the phenomenological level described earlier (section 4.1).  
Suppose IIT is right that the phenomenal content maps onto the major complex. If the 
subjective attitude maps onto the noetic complex, then, this gives some ground to suppose 
that the interaction between the subjective attitude and the phenomenal content at the 
phenomenological level maps onto the interaction between the noetic complex and the major 
complex at the system level. This is not so much an a priori philosophical analysis as an 
empirical conjecture open to empirical testing. Based on this conjecture, we can characterize 
the noetic complex, as a first approximation, as a minor complex that is particularly 
interactive with the major complex (Figure 1). 
We can be more specific by looking more closely at the interactions both at the 
phenomenological and the system level. At the phenomenological level, as we saw earlier, 
the subjective attitude affects the phenomenal content by affecting its self-organization, 
rather than instantly realizing a particular content. To see how such interaction between the 
two aspects of conscious experience can be specified at the system level, we only need to 
understand the interaction between the noetic complex and the major complex in terms of a 
switch between attractors from the perspective of dynamical systems theory. Attractors for a 
dynamical system are closed subsets of its phase space such that for many values of initial 
conditions, the system will evolve towards the subset (Guckenheimer & Holmes 1983, 
Lorenz 1963). Intuitively, if a system evolves in time in such a way as to approach a 
particular state, then an attractor represents this state. An important feature of attractors for 
our purpose is that they need not be fixed. External perturbations to the system may push the 
whole system towards different attractors from its current one, but without making it instantly 
arrive in the new basin of attraction (Figure 2). If this is how the noetic complex affects the 
spatial location of the major complex in the system, then there will be a systematic mapping 
between the interactions happening at the two levels. The mapping consists in how both the 
subjective attitude and the noetic complex affect their counterpart only by intervening on the 
latter’s self-organization.  
On the other hand, we also saw that the phenomenal content can affect the subjective 
attitude at the phenomenological level. To see how such interaction maps onto interactions at 
the system level, we only need to confirm that the noetic complex and the major complex are 
mutually influential––that is, that there truly is an interaction. If changes in the major 
complex affects the noetic complex by intervening on the latter’s self-organization, just as the 
latter can affect the former in this way, then such interaction at the system level will specify 
at the phenomenological level modifications of the subjective attitude by the phenomenal 
content.29 
                                                   
29 How does the distinction made at the phenomenological level between subjective acts and mere subjective 
attitudes map onto the structure of the physical system? One possibility is that the noetic complex intersects 
with the major complex when the subjective dimension figures in the phenomenal content at the 
phenomenological level, while the two complexes do not overlap when the subjective dimension remains 
outside the phenomenal content.  
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IIT hardly considers the possibility that parts of the system external to the major 
complex specify some aspect of conscious experience. The proposal that there is a special 
class of minor complex more interactive with the major complex than the rest, however, is 
one that is already made in IIT (Oizumi et al. 2014, pp. 15-16). In this sense, it is not so much 
a radical divergence as a natural extension of IIT to introduce the concept of noetic complex. 
In fact, it is an empowering extension because in addition to identifying that conscious 
experience is underpinned by certain neural patterns, it can help IIT to further explain which 
aspects of the neural patterns underpin which aspects of the experience. 
 
7. Conclusion 
We examined the integrated structure of consciousness by developing a critique of IIT from 
the perspective of philosophical phenomenology. In our view, the integrated structure of the 
phenomenal content should be understood holistically in terms of integrated Gestalts. The 
argument for this can be summarized as follows: 
 
(a) If a whole is made up of interdependent constituents, it is an integrated Gestalt. 
[Sufficient condition for being an integrated Gestalt]  
 
(b) The phenomenal content is a whole made up of interdependent constituents. 
[Phenomenological analysis]  
 
(c) The phenomenal content is an integrated Gestalt. [From (a) and (b)] 
 
Based on the holistic conception of integration, furthermore, we claimed that the integrated 
structure extends into the subjective dimension of consciousness. In other words, conscious 
experience is an integrated Gestalt that consists of a subjective attitude and a phenomenal 
content. The argument for this can be summarized as follows: 
 
(d) Conscious experience is a whole made up of a subjective attitude and a phenomenal 
content that are interdependent. [Phenomenological analysis]  
 
(e) Conscious experience is an integrated Gestalt made up of a subjective attitude and a 
phenomenal content. [From (a) and (d)] 
 
This implies a novel theoretical challenge for IIT: It requires IIT to consider how to 
accommodate the subjective dimension into its explanatory scope. We sketched one possible 
way in which IIT might meet this challenge, calling it the noetic complex proposal. We 
believe this proposal offers a natural and empowering extension of the current version of IIT; 
however, we are also genuinely open to the possibility that there be other ways to answer the 
challenge. Whatever turns out to be the best response, most importantly, IIT cannot just 
ignore the challenge once and for all. 
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